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POPULIST RETRIBUTION AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION
A.C.

PRITCHARDt

The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation
follows a predictable pattern in democratic states.' A hyperactive
market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial
pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market.
The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never
again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial
services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully
crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the
foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, greed once again
comes to displace fear as the primary motivating influence in the marketplace. And as night follows day, another market run-up occurs,
leading to a correction, and another round of calls for retribution
against the greedy moneychangers who brought on the crisis.
This is a familiar story, not worth belaboring yet again, despite
the opportunity afforded by the financial crisis ensuing from the collapse of the market for subprime mortgages. We had our latest bubble, followed by the market deflation, and the politicians are now
responding to the calls for vengeance, and perhaps, reform. Instead of
focusing narrowly on the latest iteration of this recurring pattern, in
this Article I want to compare the political response to this iteration of
financial meltdown with last century's response to the stock market
crash of October 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. Comparing
the two era's responses affords an opportunity to explore the influence, if any, that international competition in financial services regulation might have on the political thirst for retribution. International
competition in financial services was not much of a factor in the 1930s
when Franklin Delano Roosevelt pursued his New Deal agenda;
American capital markets were relatively independent of financial
markets in the rest of the world. Today, however, international cort Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan. This
essay was prepared for the Lessons of the FinancialCrisis:Implicationsfor Regulatory
Reform conference held at the Creighton University Law School. Thanks to participants at that conference for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. A useful history of the pattern can be found in

STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERI-

CAN SECURITIEs REGULATION (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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petition has the potential to substantially constrain the regulatory decisions that Barack Obama's administration is currently
contemplating.
The question: Does international competition limit the quest for
political retribution? One hypothesis: competition among jurisdictions
to attract financial services providers might limit the understandable
urge to make the bankers pay for causing the financial crisis. Politicians may trip over each other as they rush to punish the money
changers who caused the crisis, but do they want to kill the goose that
lays the golden eggs? Exacting a pound of flesh may suit short-term
political imperatives, but the financial services industry is an important source of tax revenues, and more importantly, campaign contributions for politicians. Sending the industry offshore would cut into a
critical revenue source. And there is no shortage of jurisdictions what
would welcome the money changers with open arms.
The alternative hypothesis, however, is that the populist anger particularly when it is fueled by severe economic disruption in the real
economy and high unemployment - simply dominates in the political
economy of modern democracies. In that scenario, the short term benefits that accrue to political actors from appealing to popular anger
over the financial crisis outweigh any potential long term benefits that
those actors might reap from protecting the financial sector. Which
force - competition or populism - is likely to prevail in the current
fight to reform financial regulation? To give away the ending, my
money is on populism, not competition. But there are limits to populism's force.
I.

CHASING OUT THE MONEY CHANGERS: THEN AND NOW

There are many parallels between the financial crisis that the
world faced in the 1930s and the one that we face today. The proximate cause of the Great Depression appeared to be the stock market
collapse of 1929; today it is the collapse of the subprime market and
the demise (or near demise) of a number of financial institutions that
were too heavily exposed to that sector. The political response to these
financial collapses was predictable. Roosevelt was elected with enormous popular support and a mandate to bring reform to a dysfunctional financial system that had brought the nation's real economy to
its knees; Barack Obama was elected with a similar mandate.
Roosevelt and Obama share liberal Democrat ideology, both are suspicious of unfettered free markets. Perhaps most importantly, Obama,
like Roosevelt before him, enjoys the political advantage of strong
Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. On its face, this
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electoral dominance suggests that the political wheel is well greased
for success in enacting reform.

A. THEN: ROOSEVELT
Taming Wall Street was a key theme of Roosevelt's 1932 campaign. Roosevelt's central message was that capitalism failed because
of the excesses of the capitalists. Roosevelt was quite comfortable
2
casting the debate over reform as an "us versus them" question.
Roosevelt's detractors saw his agenda as thinly veiled class warfare.
Roosevelt, however, did not flinch from the confrontation. He put the
question in explicitly moral, and indeed vaguely religious terms, in his
first inaugural address:
Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted
in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and
minds of men.
Stripped of the lure of profit by which to induce our people to
follow their false leadership, they have resorted to exhortations, pleading tearfully for restored conditions. They know
only the rules of a generation of self-seekers.
They have no vision, and when there is no vision the people
perish.
The money changers have fled their high seats in the temple
of our civilization.
We may now restore that temple to the an3
cient truths.
In the popular mind, the bankers were responsible for the financial crisis. Roosevelt seized on that perception. Roosevelt showed an
astute political sense by tapping into an incident in the life of Jesus
that would have been quite familiar to the overwhelming majority of
his constituents.4 Nonetheless, there is certain audacity to his rhetoric; it requires more than a little self-confidence to portray one's role
as a politician as akin to that of Jesus.
Three-quarters of a century later, Barack Obama recalled
Roosevelt's messianic invocation in his own call for financial reform.
Here is Obama preaching to the money changers:
Unfortunately, there are some in the financial industry who
are misreading this moment. Instead of learning the lessons
of Lehman and the crisis from which we are still recovering,
they are choosing to ignore them. They do so not just at their
2. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 19-20 (3d ed., Apsen
Publishers 2003).
3. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Inaugural Speech: (Mar. 4th, 1933),
available at http://www.hpol.org/fdr/inaug/.
4. Matthew 21:12-17.
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own peril, but at our nation's. So I want everybody here to
hear my words: We will not go back to the days of reckless
behavior and unchecked excess that was at the heart of this
crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite
for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street
cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences,
and expect that next
time, American taxpayers will be there
5
to break their fall.
"[H]ear [Obama's] words," and stirring words they are, full of moralism condemning "the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses."
The greed of the money-changers would not be allowed to imperil the
nation again.6 Once again, "Never again!"
Roosevelt and Obama share an unfettered optimism in the ability
of government to tame the forces of capitalism. In accepting the Democratic Party's nomination for President, Roosevelt promised wholesale reform of the securities and banking industries. After his
inauguration, Roosevelt wasted no time in delivering on that promise.
During his first term, Roosevelt pushed through Congress four pieces
of legislation, dramatically re-engineering the financial services
sector:
* The Securities Act of 19337 ("Securities Act") brought the
federal government into the regulation of the public offering of securities, curbing the investment bankers' prior
domination of that process. The law required corporate
issuers to make full disclosure when selling securities.
The goal was to curb the speculative excesses of the
1920s.
* The Glass-Steagall Act of 19338 ("Glass-Steagall"), which
legally separated the businesses of commercial and investment banking. The law was intended to discourage
deposit institutions from encouraging speculation in the
stock market.
* The Securities Exchange Act of 19349 ("Exchange Act')
targeted the New York Stock Exchange, regulating trad5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Financial Rescue and
Reform (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press office/
Remarks-by-the-President-on-Financial-Rescue-and-Reform-at-Federal-Hall.
Accord
Text of Obama's Speech on Financial Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/business/15obamatext.html.
6. The media seems to have caught on to the message. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd,
Virtuous Bankers? Really!?!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A31, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/opinion/lldowd.html ("I think the bankers who took government money and then gave out obscene bonuses are the same self-interested sorts
Jesus threw out of the temple.").
7. Securities Act of 2933, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (2006).
8. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
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ing practices and requiring disclosure of operations and
results by companies listing on exchanges. The Exchange
Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") to administer the securities laws.
• The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193510
("PUHCA"), which targeted the holding companies that
owned most of the public utilities in the United States at
the time. Easily the most contentious of the securities
laws pushed by Roosevelt, PUHCA went well beyond disclosure that characterized the two earlier securities statutes and permitted the SEC to break up the pyramid
structure of those holding companies and shape the corporate governance and capital structures of the reorganized
firms. PUHCA's sweeping reforms would trigger a decade-long war in the courts, as the giant utilities resisted
the efforts of the SEC to dismantle them.1 1
How did Roosevelt overcome the lobbying efforts of the financial
services industry to fend off his reform efforts? One factor paving the
way for Roosevelt's reforms was that they tended to reduce competition in the regulated sectors, and thus increased the rents available to
key market participants. The most obvious example is the Securities
Act, which discouraged competition in securities underwriting. The
Securities Act discouraged the sales tactics introduced by National
City and other commercial banks, which had begun to compete with
the traditional investment houses in the 1920s.12 Glass-Steagall put
up further barriers to competition by forcing banks to choose between
commercial and investment banking. The net effect was to preserve
pricing margins in underwriting, an effect which has persisted to this
day. Similarly, the Exchange Act largely codified the disclosure requirements of the New York Stock Exchange, offering it protection
against the laxer standards of the Curb Exchange, now known as the
American Stock Exchange. The securities laws validated quality standards, but they did so by erecting barriers to entry.
Cartelization is always helpful in overcoming opposition to regulation, but perhaps more important were the hearings orchestrated by
Ferdinand Pecora, chief counsel to the Senate. 13 To call Pecora's
staged events "hearings," which suggests an interest in uncovering
facts, would be misleading. Pecora's "show trials" would be closer to
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 79z-6 (2006).
11. The fight over PUHCA is chronicled in A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson,
Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009).
12. Paul G. Mahoney, The PoliticalEconomy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001).

13. SELIGMAN, supra note 2. Joel Seligman offers a complete account of the Pecora
hearings and their influence on the course of legislation.
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the mark; Pecora looked to score political points to underscore the
need for legislation, not attempting to enhance the understanding of
Congress. Pecora diligently sought out the evildoers in underwriting
and stock trading, but he mainly succeeded in embarrassing prominent bankers like J.P. Morgan. Throughout the process, Pecora carefully courted media coverage, with marked success, regularly making
front-page news. 14 It is hard to imagine Pecora's show trials receiving
the same sort of media attention today. One must take into account
the media milieu of the era. Much less news was available at the time
(no 24/7 coverage of Brad and Angelina!), so carefully orchestrated
Congressional hearings had much greater impact then than they
would now. Moreover, the Great Depression dragged on and on - with
devastatingly high rates of unemployment and accompanying economic misery. Consequently, the anger at the bankers - popularly believed to have caused the Great Depression - was unabated.
Pecora tapped into that anger, making shrewd choices in bringing
sunshine to perceived abuses. His preferred target: "excessive" compensation. In a nation beset by economic misery, envy was the key to
enacting reform. As Joel Seligman writes:
The revelations of the Pecora hearings were intended to diminish . . . faith in the nation's financial institutions. No
other explanation can account for the attention lavished by
Pecora such matters as the salary levels and income tax returns of the financiers who appeared before him. Such data
were virtually irrelevant to an investigation of the causes of
the stock market crash. But in the political context in which
the Senate Banking Committee functioned, such data seemed
essential. In spite of the severity of the stock market crash,
effective securities legislation might not have been enacted
support
had Pecora's revelations not galvanized broad public
15
for direct federal regulation of the stock markets.
Pecora uncovered the shocking revelation that the partners at the
Morgan firm paid no taxes in 1931 and 1932, generating considerable
press coverage. Less well covered by the papers, however, was the fact
that the Morgan partners had not generated any income in those
years, as their stock market losses in a free-falling market eclipsed
any income that they might have eked out. 16 No income, no income
tax. Foreshadowing today's debates, Pecora also tried to pin the
blame for financial recklessness on extravagant incentive compensa14. See Paul Mahoney, The stock pools and the SecuritiesExchange Act, 51 J. FIN.
ECON. 343, 347 (1999).
15. SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
16. Id. at 33.
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tion.17 The regulations that Congress ultimately enacted to check the
financiers' compensation, however, focused on disclosure rather than
directly limiting pay.1 8 The presumption was that shame would curb
the bankers' appetite for exorbitant salaries. In hindsight, this seems
naive. As a group, bankers seem relatively immune to shame.
The bottom line for Roosevelt was that populist anger against the
bankers provided him with the political capital he needed to fundamentally reshape the financial sector in the United States. Roosevelt
succeeded in breaking up the commercial/investment banking giants,
curtailing the most aggressive selling tactics of the securities underwriters, and putting the New York Stock Exchange and its brokerdealer members under the watchful eye of the newly-created SEC.
Roosevelt won a great political victory against the capitalists, but he
did so in a world in which capital markets were generally fragmented
on a country-specific basis. Is Barack Obama likely to have the same
success in reshaping finance in a world of integrated capital markets?
B.

Now: OBAMA

Simply based on the sheer number of proposals made, Obama's
vision of regulatory reform equals Roosevelt's in its ambition. 19 But
once one delves into the details, some aspects of the plan look rather
timid. Raising capital requirements was a given of any reform. 20 But
imposing more stringent capital requirements on the largest banks
provides an implicit list - and accompanying subsidy - of the institutions that the government deemed "too big to fail." The moral hazard
problem created by "too big to fail" is the central problem of reform.
Obama's plan addresses that problem with a conservatorship provision that would wipe out equity holders. 2 1 The administration tacitly
rejected reform proposals to directly reduce the size of banks, as some
- like Alan Greenspan - have urged. 22 This exposed Obama's left
17. Id. at 26.
18. See generally Harwell Wells, "No Man can be worth $1,000,000 a year": The
Fight Over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. _
(forthcoming, 2010).
19. For a useful synopsis, see Washington Wire, Obama's FinancialReform Plan:
The Condensed Version, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2009/06/17/obamas-financial-reform-plan-the-condensed-version/tab/article/.
20. Stephen Labaton, N.Y. TiMEs, DealBook, Treasury Unveils Proposal for New
Bank Capital Rules, , available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/
treasury-unveils-proposal-for-new-bank-capital-rules/ (Sept. 3, 2009, 18:33).
21. Stephen Labaton, Bill Seeks to Shift Rescue Costs to Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/us/politics/28
regulate.html.
22. Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, GreenspanSays U.S. Should ConsiderBreaking Up Large Banks, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg; David Wessel, Three Theories on Solv-
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flank, as some lawmakers pursued legislation that would break up the
banks, either based on size, or by restoring the Glass-Steagall limits
that precluded the combination of investment and commercial
23
banking.
Notably absent from Obama's proposal is any consolidation of
agencies. There is some shuffling of agencies, with a new National
Bank Supervisor to be created, while the Office of Thrift Supervision
is to get the axe. But the alphabet soup of banking regulators continues, albeit with augmented powers. The long-standing jurisdictional
overlap between the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") is not eliminated by combining the agencies; instead,
Obama's administration has instructed the agencies to play nice
through greater harmonization. Charged with a wholesale overhaul
of the regulatory system, the administration appears to have sought
the path of least resistance in carrying out that mandate, at least
when it comes to dealing with entrenched bureaucracies - and the
Congressional patrons who love them.
When it comes to vesting those agencies with new mandates and
new authority, however, Obama is anything but cautious. Most telling is the extension of government authority into previously unregulated territory. The Obama administration's plan greatly expands the
powers for the Federal Reserve, setting it up as an "uber-regulator"
charged with controlling systemic risk. A new Consumer Financial
Protection Agency would be created to protect consumers by overseeing credit cards and mortgages. Over-the-counter derivatives would
be forced on exchange, and therefore, into the regulated sphere.
Hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital firms would be
required to register with the SEC, with hedge funds subject to particu24
lar scrutiny.
This last set of proposals is particularly puzzling. No one has seriously suggested that hedge funds, private equity, or venture capitalists played any role in causing the financial crisis. If anything, hedge
funds are useful antidote to a bubble mentality. Private equity and
venture capitalists are essentially irrelevant to that problem; they oping the 'Too Big to Fail' Problem, WALL ST. J. A2 (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http:/
online.wsj.com/article/SB125668497563411667.html.
23. Damian Paletta & Michael R. Critteden, Curbing Size of Big Firms, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 10, 2009, at A5, available at http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB12578117580073
9933.html (discussing bills in House); N.Y. TIMES, Dealbook, Senator Seeks to Break Up
Banks 'Too Big to Fail,' (Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com
2009/11/06/senator-seeks-to-break-up-banks-too-big-to-fail/
(discussing billed introduced by Senator Bernard Sanders to break up large banks).
24. Kevin Drawbaugh & Rachelle Younglai,CongressionalPanelBacks New Rules
for Hedge Funds, REUTERS, October 27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE59Q5BY20091027.
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erate in a totally different sphere. So why add more regulation to one
of the few bright spots in the financial services industry? As Rahm
Emanuel noted shortly after Obama's election, "You never want a serious crisis to go to waste." 2 5 Hedge fund managers are (at least some of
them) incredibly wealthy people. These are people well-positioned to
make political contributions to head off draconian regulation. 26 Given
the inevitability of compromise, however, draconian regulation is
never the first step. The first step is registration, and a bit of disclosure. Once that beachhead has been secured, truly invasive regulation becomes a credible threat in the wake of the next scandal. That
credible regulatory threat is essential to the ability of politicians to
extract contributions from the regulated industry. 2 7 Contribute, or
we'll regulate! Regulation - or more accurately, the political class that
feeds off it - abhors a vacuum.
Another objection that might be raised to the overall expansion of
government power is that for every failed market institution in the
late crisis, one can also point a finger at a corresponding failed regulatory institution. 28 American International Group ("AIG") imploded as
a consequence of lax risk management? The Office of Thrift Supervision had jurisdiction, but failed to exercise it. Turning to the big investment banks, Lehman, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch all overextended themselves? The SEC oversaw their capital requirements
(or lack thereof). Credit rating agencies failed to predict the meltdown
of the market for mortgage-backed securities? The SEC had recently
been given greater regulatory authority over the industry. Mortgages
extended to borrowers with little hope of repaying? Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae were there to guarantee the loans, backed by an implicit
government backstop.
Roosevelt had the advantage of being able to point the finger exclusively at the financiers. If there was a regulatory failure, it was at
the state level. The states' failure to adequately grapple with the
problems merely reinforced the need for federal intervention.
Roosevelt plowed virgin regulatory ground for the federal government.
25. Jack Rosenthal, On Language:A Terrible Thing to Waste, N.Y. TiMEs July 31,,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t.

html.
26. Hedge funds were good for some $60 million in contributions in 2008. Center
for Responsive Politics, Hedge Funds: Money to Congress, http://www.opensecrets.org/
industries/summary.php?cycle=2008&ind.=f2700. They have been gearing up to try
and ward of the regulatory onslaught. Zachery Kouwe, Funds Try to Ward Off New
Regulations, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/10/01/funds-try-to-ward-off-new-regulations.
27. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997).

28. Gretchen Morgenson, But Who Is Watching the Regulators?, N.Y. Times, Sept.
13, 2009, at BUL.
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Obama, by contrast, is stuck with a singularly awkward fact: the regulatory failure of the mortgage crisis was at the hands of the regulators
who are now to be charged with preventing the recurrence of the crisis. This is less than satisfying for voters keen on retribution. Political morality plays are more compelling when there is a clean division
between the white hats and the black hats.
Obama's ambitious agenda met with widespread acclaim when it
29
was announced, but it has since run into some strong headwinds.
The government's first high profile criminal case arising out of the
subprime meltdown was rebuffed by the jury.30 The government's
high profile effort at scapegoating fell short: "The entire market
31
crashed," one juror explained. "You can't blame that on two people."
But you can try to pin it on an entire class: the bankers. Astonishingly, the bankers appear reluctant to shoulder the blame. The inevitable regrouping of the banking industry and its lobbying efforts is
posing more of a challenge for Obama's reform efforts. Obama does
not have a Pecora to keep the drumbeat for reform going. 3 2 As Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner observed, "Time is the enemy of reform."3 3 This is particularly true when time is accompanied by signs
of economic recovery. 3 4 Roosevelt had the advantage (!?) of ongoing
economic misery; the thirst for vengeance against the financial plutocrats went unabated well into the mid-1930s. Today, the stock market
has shown signs of renewed vigor. The banks have begun to return to
profitability, perhaps bolstered by the cheap financing provided by the
government. When the banks depended upon the largesse of the federal government, they were on the mat as a political force. As the
banks have paid back the bailout money, however, they lost their com29. Elizabeth Williamson and Damian Paletta, Obama Urges Bankers to Back Financial Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A4. ("[Obamal's proposed changes to
financial rules have bogged down in part because of backlash from banks and conservative lawmakers.").
30. Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 2009, at Al.
31. William D. Cohan, How the Scapegoats Escaped, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 2009,
A35.
32. Congress has created a commission to examine the causes of the financial crisis, but is a pale imitation of Pecora's efforts. Critically, it is not scheduled to complete
its report until the end of 2010, well after the debate over regulatory reform will have
finished. See Stephen Labaton, A Panel Is Named to Examine Causes of the Economic
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at B3.
33. Robert Schmidt, Geithner Says 'Time Is the Enemy' of FinancialRules Overhaul, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601103&sid=aOrFGAIzzTQE
34. Associated Press, Urgency For New Rules For Finance Is Slipping Away (Sept.
16, 2009).
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punction about lobbying against regulatory reform. 35 (This only angers the electorate more; the bankers should submit and take their
punishment.) Threats to break up large banks galvanized Wall Street
lobbyists into action, 36 and Congressmen have campaigns to finance
in 2010. It is never too soon to start extracting campaign contributions from a regulated industry; a crisis is a terrible thing to waste - it
is a fundraising opportunity of a political lifetime!
Bickering also broke out among regulators about the regulatory
functions to be shifted about, 37 provoking a testy response from Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. 3 s Most surprising perhaps has
been the reaction of the Senate to the failure to consolidate any of the
banking agencies. Although the House of Representatives went along
with the blueprint provided by the Obama administration, the Senate
Finance Committee broke ranks, sending out a bill that would consolidate banking supervision in a single regulator.
The Senate bill would also remove substantial oversight authority
from the Federal Reserve (the "Fed"). 39 Critics of Obama's plan
warned that giving the Fed more authority would undermine its independence. 40 Heeding their concerns was Senator Christopher Dodd,
Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, who apparently considered
the Obama plan insufficient on retribution against the failed regulators. After all, Dodd was running for re-election, and "Even if his regulatory-overhaul plan runs aground, it could help Mr. Dodd position
himself as a populist lawmaker willing to wage war on powerful financial institutions."4 1 A willingness to wage war is the critical factor in
regulatory reform - at least as far as the voters are concerned. Of
35. Stephen Labaton, Lobbyists Mass to Try to Shape Financial Reform, N.Y.
TIMES,OCt. 15, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/business/15
regulate.html ; Graham Bowley, Two Giants Emerge From Wall Street Ruins, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2009, at Al.
36. Bank Breakup Plan, Still Unseen, Draws Wall St. Ire, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/bank-breakup-plan-still-unseen-draws-wall-st-ire/ (Nov. 12, 2009,
18:21).
37. Stephen Labaton, F.D.I.C. Chiefs Criticizes Reform Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2009, B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/business/30regulate.html;
Richard Beales, Battle is Brewing Over Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, B2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/business/22views.html.
38. Stephen Labaton, Geithner Takes Regulators to Task on Turf Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/politics/
06regulate.html ("One participant in the meeting said the bank regulators felt that Mr.
Geithner treated them like children being reprimanded by a parent.").
39. Stephen Labaton, Senate Plan Would Expand Regulation of Risky Lending,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/lll/
business/llregulate.html.
40. Edmund L. Andrews, Two Authorities on Fed Advise Congress Against Expanding Its Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.
comI2009/07/10/businessleconomy/10fed.html.
41. Damian Paletta, Clash Looms on Banks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2009, at Al, A6.
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course, as independent agencies go, the Fed comes closest to actual
independence from Congress, unlike the banking agencies, SEC, and
42
CFTC, which are quite vulnerable to Congressional manipulation.
The Fed, not surprisingly, was of the view that its mission made it
critical that it retain supervisory authority over banks. 43 Girding for
the fight, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke brushed up on how to deal
44
with Congress.
Amidst all the squabbling inside the Beltway, where is there still
some semblance of consensus? The insidious evil of incentive compensation. When it comes to pay issues, the populism that helped fuel
Roosevelt's successful drive for reform is again on abundant display.
Sometimes that display is rather embarrassing, such as Senator
Charles Grassley's call for ritual suicide by executives at AIG who received retention bonuses after the United States government bailed
the company out. Never mind that the AIG executives receiving bonuses were not the ones responsible for its losses, or that losses would
have been much worse if they left the firm. 4 5 Also ignore the fact that
AIG is losing key employees to competitors. 4 6 These are details.
Grassley is just the most extreme example of politicians fulminating over excessive executive pay in the financial services sector. Political actors with actual responsibilities also stepped in to crack down
on pay. Andrew Cuomo, the New York State Attorney General,
burnished his credentials for governor by bullying AIG executives into
paying back a portion of those ill-gotten bonuses that so enraged
Grassley. 4 7 Cuomo also launched an assault on another front against
bankers' bonuses by launching an investigation of Merrill Lynch

42. See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement? 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1073 (2005) (discussing Congress's control over the SEC and its impact on securities regulation). Dodd's plan is notable in that it would free the SEC from dependence
on Congress for funding, allowing the agency to keep the levies it imposes on stock
trading. Labaton, supra note 39. The chances of this provision surviving in the final
bill strike me as remote.
43. Paletta, supra note 41.
44. Edmund L. Andrews, UnderAttack, Fed ChiefStudies Politics,NY TiMEs, Nov.
11, 2009, at Al.
45. Letter from Jake DeSantis, Executive Vice President, AIG to Edward M. Liddy,
CEO, AIG, New York Times (March 25, 2009) (available at http://www.nytimes.coml
2009/03/25/opinionl25desantis.html). Shockingly, the political backlash pushed a number of the AIG managers out the door, increasing the cost of unwinding the losing positions. Liam Pleven & Randall Smith, Action on AIG Unit May Cost Taxpayers, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at Cl.
46. Mary Williams Walsh, Ex-A.I.G. Chief Is Back, Luring Talent From Rescued
Firm, NY TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at Al.
47. A.I.G. Memo Hints at Pressure From Cuomo, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/03/24/aig-memo-points-to-pressure-from-cuomo/ (March 24, 2009, 15:05).).
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before that firm merged with Bank of America. 48 Cuomo needs to be
careful:
[Tihere is a division among state officials over how vigorously New York's attorney general should batter Wall Street.
On the one hand, there has been outrage across the country
at the enormous bill for the rescue of Wall Street, even as
tales of greed, excess and Ponzi schemes have proliferated.
On the other hand, New York depends on Wall Street for
and its latest troubles
about a fifth of the state's revenue,
49
have depleted the state's coffers.
If Cuomo pushes too hard, that golden goose could quickly cross the
river to New Jersey.
Politicians at the federal level may have more room to maneuver
in assuaging the popular outrage. The Obama administration, not
wanting to be outflanked by state regulators, appointed a "pay czar,"
Kenneth Feinberg, charged with overseeing compensation at firms receiving bailout funds. Feinberg made headlines above the fold when
he ordered sweeping pay cuts at those firms. 50 The paycuts came
amidst huge departures of top talent at those firms. 5 1 Certain profitable divisions - with exorbitant pay for their traders - had to be sold off
rather than face the scrutiny of the pay czar. 52 Despite the fact that
the profitability of the bailed out firms was key to the government
being repaid, anger at pay levels trumped worry over bailout funds
being dissipated. A more widespread, if less draconian, initiative
came from the Fed. The Fed is considering a plan to review banks'
compensation schemes to ferret out excessive risk taking. 5 3 The Senate bill also attempts to crack down on compensation that engenders
48. Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, New York Atty. Gen'l to Honorable Barney
Frank, Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services (February 10, 2009), availa(describing
ble at http://www.ag.ny.gov/mediacenter/2009/feb/merrill%201etter.pdf,
Cuomo's investigation into payment of bonuses at Merrill Lynch after government sponsored merger with Bank of America).
49. Danny Hakim, Not RunningAgainst Wall St., N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 29, 2009, at B1.
50. Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Slashed at Bailout Firms, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 22, 2009, at Al.
51. Louise Story, Who Gets Paid What, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at B1. "When
Bank of America submitted the names of top executives to Mr. Feinberg, its representatives pointed out that 45 of the top 100 employees at the bank and Merrill had left." Id.
Feinberg appears to be open to paying their replacements market rates. David Lawder,
Obama Pay Czar Says Open to Competitive Pay Offers, REUTERS, Nov. 12, 2009, http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AB2RF20091112. This invites the question of
whether it would be simpler to retain the existing employees by paying them market
rates, does it not?
52. Louise Story, Pay Czar Doubts Cuts Will Make Bankers Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2009, at B8. (detailing sale of Citigroup's Philbro unit).
53. Damian Paletta & Jon Hilsenrath, Bankers Face Sweeping Curbs on Pay, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2009, at Al.
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an undefined level of "excessive risk." Excessive risk? They will know
it when they see it. They are experts after all.
Widely ignored in this flurry to crack down on the pay of financial
executives is the fact that those executives have lost millions of dollars
in worth as their stock portfolios shriveled. Bank shareholders have
been hit hard, but the managers of those firms, underdiversified with
respect to exposure to their employers' stock, have been hit much
harder. They can still afford the private school tuition for the kids,
but it does not require much empathy to see that they have shared
their shareholders' pain. 54 This is not a distributive justice point; it is
a simple matter of risk management policy. Inflicting more pain on
bank executives may help assuage the popular anger, but it is unlikely
to make those executives more sensitive to the consequences of their
decisions. The more likely response to the crackdown on pay is to
head for the door. The question is: Where will they head? And will
the exodus be only individual executives, or will firms be leaving as
well?
II.

FINANCIAL CRISES: THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Obama faces one obstacle in 2009 that Roosevelt did not need to
worry about in 1933: a radically transformed financial sector that now
transcends national boundaries. Companies can raise financing in
markets around the world as capital now flows as freely as other goods
and services. 5 5 Jurisdictional competition spread from corporate law
to its close cousin, securities law. Historically, issuers listed their
stock for trading on one of the exchanges in the country where they
principally did business. Improvements in communication and related technologies, however, have made possible an internationalmarket for stock exchange listings that resembles in many respects the
long-standing federal market for corporate charters in the United
States. Now companies can list their shares for trading on exchanges
in any number of countries; there is no longer a logical nexus between
the site of a company's headquarters and where its shares are traded.
Chinese companies, for example, are listed in Shanghai and Hong
Kong, but also in New York. Investors can realistically allocate their
savings to companies around the world. Our world today - unlike the
world of the 1930s - is marked by free trade in capital. Does that free
movement of capital limit the ability of the Obama administration to
reform financial regulation in the United States?
54. David Yermack, Keeping the Pay Police At Bay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at
Wl.
55. My argument here borrows from, and expands upon, my earlier article, A.C.
Pritchard, London as Delaware?, 78 U. CiN. L. REV. -(forthcoming, 2010).
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New York's principal rival for the status of the world's leading
financial center is London. After the United States effectively raised
listing standards by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 5 6 in 2002, foreign companies headed for the door. 5 7 London seized the opportunity;
fourteen of the top twenty initial public offerings ("IPOs") listed on the
London Stock Exchange ("LSE") came from outside the United Kingdom in 2005 to 2008. By contrast, only four of the top twenty IPOs in
New York came from outside the United States. 58 Further, it was not
only foreign companies that were leaving; United States companies
left the public market in droves, headed for the greener (or at less
regulated) fields of private equity, and they were not being replaced.
A Grant Thornton study documented a staggering thirty-nine percent
decline in United States listings from a peak of 8,823 in 1997 to only
5,401 in 2008.59
While New York hemorrhaged listings, London's pool of liquidity
grew deeper, as it developed its own community of hedge funds and
private equity. The United Kingdom is heavily dependent on financial
services, with the financial services industry growing from 5.3 percent
of the economy in 2001 to 9.4 percent in 2006,60 and employing a halfmillion people in London alone. 6 1 Moreover, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority's ("FSA") "light touch" approach to regulation gives London a predictability edge over New York, which is
subject to the much more intrusive (and expensive) scrutiny of the
62
London's unitary financial services regulator also reduces
SEC.
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
57. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Summary of Competitiveness Measures (2008) (noting that 15% of foreign firms listed on the NYSE delisted in 2007). See
also Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rene M. Stulz, Why Do Foreign Firms Leave
U.S. Equity Markets?, (Dice Center Working Paper No. 2009-3, 2009) (finding that departing firms had lower growth prospects and capital requirements).
58. REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON's FINANCIAL CENTRE, LONDON:
WINNING IN A CHANGING WORLD (2008), available at http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/

economy/docs/london-winning-changing-world.pdf. (Page 13, Exhibit 3). See also Joseph
D. Piotroski & Suraj Srivivasn, Regulation & Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Flow of InternationalListings (Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 11) (2008), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=956987.
(finding a shift in smaller firm listings post-Sarbanes-Oxley).
59. Lynn Cowan, Stock Study Laments the 'GreatDepression of Listings,' WALL ST.
J., Nov. 10, 2009, at M4.
60. REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON's FINANCIAL CENTRE, LONDON:
WINNING IN A CHANGING WORLD (2008), available at http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/

economy/docs/london-winning-changing-world.pdf. (Page 13, Exhibit 4).
61. REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON's FINANCIAL CENTRE, LONDON:
WINNING

IN

A CHANGING WORLD (2008), available at http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/

economy/docs/london-winning-changing-world.pdf. (Page 14, Exhibit 5).
62. SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP
(2007), available at http://www.abanet.orglbuslaw/committees/CLll6000pub/materials/
library/NYSchumer-Bloomberg REPORTFINAL.pdf. (Page 77, reporting survey results of senior executives indicating greater perceived predictability of legal regime in
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compliance costs in the United Kingdom relative to those imposed by
the splintered regulatory structure found in the United States, with
its alphabet soup of federal and state agencies, regulating broker-dealers, banks, and insurers. Will London take advantage of the populist
onslaught on New York?
The early returns suggest no; British politicians and regulators
are happy to join in the feeding frenzy. British banks melted down in
lockstep with those in the United States. 6 3 The rhetoric now emanating from London is strongly suggestive that populist retribution has
taken hold in the United Kingdom just as it has in the United States.
A conspicuous example is Adair Turner, head of the FSA. One would
not have suspected Turner of being a closet foe of capitalism; he was
the Former Vice-Chair of Merrill Lynch Europe. However, his current
language sounds very much like Louis Brandeis's warnings about the
curse of bigness. 64 In a recent speech, Turner called for a radical reduction in the size of the financial services sector in the United Kingdom. Turner worried that "some of it is socially useless activity," and
that the sector has "swollen beyond its socially useful size." 6 5 Turner
struck at the heart of the financial services industry by suggesting the
66
adoption of a tax on securities transactions, a so-called Tobin tax.
He warned that regulators should not be involved in promoting the
competitiveness of the British financial services industry: "It's clear to
me that the FSA has to be very, very wary of seeing the competitiveness of London as a major aim."6 7 Turner's suggestions may or may
not be sensible policy; they are clearly inimical to the goal of the
United Kingdom's competitiveness as a financial center. Turner is not
concerned.
Turner's chief lieutenant, Hector Sants, sounded positively
Obama-esque in chiding the bankers: "There remains, I believe, an
absence of the acceptance of collective responsibility for what has hapthe U.K.). The U.K.'s "light touch" approach should not be confused with a laissez
faire" attitude. See Eilfs Ferran, Capital Market Competitiveness and Enforcement
(University of Cambridge Working Paper, at 6,2008) (discussing recent enforcement actions brought by the FSA).
63. Jon Menon & Andrew MacAskill, U.K. Faced 'Bank Runs, Riots' as RBS and
HBOS Neared Collapse, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMfETcYI2t7Y.
64.

Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF Louis D.

BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel and Clarence M. Lewis, eds., The Viking Press 1934).
65. Patrick Hosking, FSA chairman Lord Turner says City too big, THE TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2009).
66. Landon Thomas, Jr., Britain'sTop FinancialRegulator Takes On Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at B1.
67. Hosking, supra note 65.
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pened."68 It is not at all clear what the "acceptance of collective responsibility" would look like, or how it would change anything. Sants
earlier warned that the bankers to blame for the crisis should be "very
frightened" of the FSA; more ominously, he declared that "a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no principles." 6 9 Sants, like Turner, is not worried about maintaining British
competitiveness in financial services. Sants may have been burnishing his credentials in an effort to retain an important regulatory
role. The Conservative Party, likely to reclaim power in the United
Kingdom's next elections, pledged to strip the FSA's regulatory au70
thority over banks and give it to the Bank of England ("BOE").
Sants is rumored to be in line for a position at the BOE in a Tory
government. 7 1 The BOE took a hawkish line toward the banks. Notably, the head of the BOE, Mervyn King, called for the breakup of the
big banks. 7 2 King appeared to go out of his way to outflank the FSA;
73
the FSA's efforts amounted to "little real reform," according to King.
The Labour Party took up the call as well. The Chancellor of the
Exchequor, Alistair Darling, picked up on the moral outrage. "'The
whole world is angry about it but they just don't get it,' he said as he
decried the level of pay packages now being discussed. 'There are far
too many people in the banking world who haven't caught the change
in sentiment."' 74 Darling is angry, not only at the bankers but also
with the banks' shareholders. "Their shareholders clearly didn't ask
75
the right questions. They didn't take their stewardship seriously."
The notion of "stewardship" is generally not associated with shareholders, who are generally viewed as passive renters of capital, but
the obvious problems of collective action and rational apathy apparently cannot stand in the way of widespread outrage. In another sign
that the Labour politicians are desperate to retain their jobs, Prime
Minister Gordon Brown recently endorsed Turner's idea of a transaction tax at a recent meeting of the G-20, only to be rebuffed by Trea68. Juli Werdigier, FinancialRegulations Chief Chides British Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2009, at B12.
69. FSA to 'frighten' with tough stance, FINANCiAL TiMEs, http://www.ft.com/cms/s
0/2dbf2b7e-Oef8-llde-balO-0000779fd2ac,sOl=l.html?ftcamp=rss&nclick_check=1
(March 13, 2009, 00:15).
70. Laurence Norman & Alistair MacDonald, Tories Ready a Plan to Bulk Up BOE,
WALL ST. J, Sept. 14, 2009, at C5.
71. Conservatives Want Sants as Bank Deputy, REUTERS, Nov. 13, 2009, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5AC1A320091113.
72. Natasha Brereton & Stephen Fidler, BOE's King: Big Banks Should Get Broken Up, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2009, at C1.
73. Id. at C2.
74. Patience Wheatcroft, U.K's DarlingBlasts Banks' Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov.
13, 2009, at C2.
75. Id.
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sury Secretary Geithner. 7 6 British regulators appear to be trying to
outdo each other in getting tough on the banks; they are clearly prepared to administer more retribution than the Americans, competitiveness be damned.
The United Kingdom's regulatory crackdown is taking place
against the backdrop of threatened regulation by the European Union
("EU"). Involving the EU, however, creates plenty of room for disagreement. For example, France and Germany are less keen on bolstering capital requirements because it would require their banks to
catch up with better capitalized American banks. This is an important political issue in those countries, as French and German companies are considerably more dependent on bank financing. 7 7 Bolstering
capital requirements would necessarily come at the expense of lending, and hence, economic growth. The United States papered over the
quarrel with the continental nations with the classic evasion of putting off the question of specific ratios until the end of 2010.78 Perhaps
there will be a stronger economic recovery by then, bolstering the tolerance of European politicians for more stringent capital requirements. Or perhaps stronger economic recovery will diminish the
recollection of the pain of the downturn and bolster the bankers' ability to resist more stringent capital requirements. But specificity of
capital ratios cannot be avoided forever if capital requirements are to
have any teeth.
When it comes to banker pay, however, Europe is in accord. "Europe is united on a strong political message," said French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, an enthusiastic proponent of caps on compensation. 79 France already imposed its own limits; having done so, it will
want to level the playing field so that banks headquartered in other
countries are subject to the same constraints.8 0 Of course, the financial sector is much smaller in France than in Britain; political posturing poses minimal risk of capital flight. Further, the French inventors of the guillotine - understand populist retribution better
than anyone!
When it comes to banker pay issues, jurisdictional competition
seems to be a nonfactor. Even Switzerland and Hong Kong - not
76. Laurence Norman & Paul Hannon, U.S., U.K Split Over Bank-Tax Proposalat
G-20, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at A12.
77. Damian Paletta & Alessandra Galloni, Europe, U.S. Spar On Cure For Banks,
WALL ST. J. Al (Sept. 23, 2009).
78. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Hopes for Global Accord on FinancialReforms, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at B5.
79. Stephen Castle, Banker Pay to Face Global Limits at G-20 Session, NY TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2009, at B6.
80. Gabriele Parussini & Laurence Norman, France Lunges for Bankers' Pay,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2009, at A3.
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places that one would ordinarily associate with stringent limits on
81
banks - stepped up with their own proposals to limit bankers' pay.
On this issue in financial reform, there seems to be an emerging consensus - bankers' paychecks are going to be closely tied to the longterm performance of their employers.
Politicians also agree on the desirability of regulating hedge
funds, but here jurisdictional competition is likely to have a greater
impact. Unlike the banks, which require the backing of a lender of
last resort and the implicit protection of the "too big to fail" doctrine,
hedge funds can go elsewhere if a country tries to enmesh them in red
tape. Running a hedge fund only requires an office and an Internet
connection. To be sure, the speed of that Internet connection may be a
constraint under current technology - quantitative traders want immediacy - but it is difficult to see that being an obstacle to hedge fund
mobility in the long run. Debates over hedge fund regulation take
place against the shadow of the threat of the flight of these financial
intermediaries.
And that flight has already begun. The United Kingdom raised
its top tax rate to fifty percent in April. That move, along with EU
restrictions on borrowing by hedge funds, already prompted a number
of hedge funds to emigrate to greener pastures.8 2 The exodus is likely
to turn into a flood if EU regulations limiting hedge fund pay are implemented; the EU proposed requiring that up to sixty percent of
hedge fund managers' income be deferred for up to three years.8 3 Not
surprisingly, the hedge funds believe they are "being targeted for public retribution in the same way as investment bankers, despite reports
confirming that they had nothing to do with the causes of the financial
crisis."8 4 Hedge fund bankers are not happy about being treated like
bankers. Unlike bankers, however, they do not have to stick around
and take it. "About [twenty] percent of the hedge-fund community
could leave the [United Kingdom] in the next two or three years. The
85
feeling among the hedge-community is there is a better place to be."
Where is that better place? Asia. Places like Singapore are attracting hedge funds because "Everything in Singapore is so well or81. Jonathan Cheng, Hong Kong Is Moving To Tighten Banker Pay, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 30, 2009, at C2; Anita Greil, Swiss RegulatorSets New Pay Rules, WALL ST.J., Nov.
12, 2009, at C2.
82. Alison Fitzgerald, New York Eclipses London as FinancialCenter in Bloomberg
Poll, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
sid=aECOOYmvvcZM.
83. Louise Armitstead, Hedge Funds Demand Change to EU Pay Plan,DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2009.
84. Id.
85. Fitzgerald, supra note 82. (quoting David Butler of the consulting firm Kinetic
Partners L.L.P.).
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ganized. Everything is so efficient. Everything works." 86 Of course,
the fact that Singapore does not tax capital gains may have had something to do with its attractiveness. Its proximity to China, with the
prolific savings being generated in that country probably does not
hurt. Singapore faces strong competition for the savings being generated in Asia. Shanghai would like traders to think of it as the financial center of choice. So would Dubai, with its proximity to the
petrodollars being generated in the Gulf. London and New York? The
politicians overseeing those financial centers have other priorities.
So what does global competition mean for populist retribution
against the money changers? Apparently it depends on the mobility of
the money changes you are talking about. Big banks need government backing to be credible with depositors and counterparties, so the
bankers at those institutions are going to have to stick around and
take it. Smaller institutions, like hedge funds, are much more portable, and if Western governments attempt to impose banker-like restrictions on them, they will head elsewhere.
The exodus of the hedge funds, however, does have implications
for the banks. Banks compete with hedge funds in proprietary trading
(a big source of profits), and for the top employees who create those
profits. Banks will be hamstrung when participating in those markets, both by the limitations on banker pay and by capital requirements. The end result may be bifurcated regulation - regulation
based on populist retribution for the big banks because they depend on
government backing, and regulation driven by jurisdictional competition for hedge funds. That jurisdictional competition for hedge funds
may limit the activities of the big banks.
III.

CONCLUSION

Barack Obama confronts a radically different financial landscape
from the one that confronted Franklin Delano Roosevelt back in 1933.
For Roosevelt, all that was needed to enact sweeping regulatory reform of the financial services industry was to muster the requisite political will. In fairness, that was no small matter given the opposition.
Ferdinand Pecora helped to galvanize that political will by fueling the
pre-existing anger at the bankers with eye-catching headlines about
the obscene compensation received by those bankers and their failure
to pay taxes. Anger mixed with envy is a righteous combination.
Roosevelt tapped that powerful political impulse to tame the forces of
capitalism with his agenda.
86. Id. (quoting Gary Addison, partner at Actis Capital LLP, who had worked in
London and Tokyo before moving to Singapore).
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For Obama, the political equation is complicated by the international integration of financial markets. The forces of financial capitalism can no longer be confined within the boundaries of a single nation,
so regulation is not simply a matter of mustering the requisite political will. There is no shortage of anger against the bankers in the current environment, but it can only be deployed against financial
intermediaries who cannot flee the regulatory wrath. The large
banks, dependent on the government backing implicit in the "too big
to fail" doctrine, have to take it. Hedge fund managers, who do not
need the backing of the government to give them credibility with
counterparties, are free to go where regulatory constraints impose the
least cost on their preferred business model. International competition in financial services regulation now serves as a check on populist
retribution, but only a partial one.
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